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TREATING RELIGION AS SPEECH: JUSTICE
STEVENS'S RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
Eduardo Moisgs Pehialver*
INTRODUCTION
Justice Stevens has sometimes been caricatured as the U.S. Supreme
Court Justice who hates religion. Whether considering questions under the
Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise Clause, questions about the
funding or regulation of religious groups, or the permissibility of religious
speech in public places, in case after case he has voted against religion.
Like most caricatures, this view of Justice Stevens is based on a kernel of
truth. He does appear to be more likely to vote against religious groups
than any other Justice. But an exploration of the cases in which Justice
Stevens has voted in favor of religious claimants reveals that, rather than
being moved by a reflexive hostility toward religion, he appears to respect
religion as a powerful motivator of human action that is largely protected
by the political process. Religion's power makes it a singularly divisive
category of human activity and makes religious favoritism a uniquely
seductive temptation that the conscientious legislator (and judge) must
carefully avoid. Although Justice Stevens may take this respectful
apprehension of religion too far, his views are a far cry from the sort of
blatant hostility of which he is often accused.
In Part I, I lay out the standard case for Justice Stevens's hostility
towards religion. I then challenge the soundness of that view in Part II by
discussing the various cases in which Justice Stevens has voted in favor of
religious claimants. In Part III, I attempt to formulate a principle that ties
Justice Stevens's various religion votes together, a principle that I
characterize as "respectful apprehension." Notwithstanding my rejection of
the common view of Justice Stevens as hostile to religion, I argue in Part IV
that there are substantial problems with Justice Stevens's actual approach.
First, Justice Stevens has a tendency to treat religion as no more valuable
than other valuable categories of expressive activity, a tendency that brings
him into agreement with a great deal of recent scholarly commentary on the
religion clauses, but which I think is ultimately mistaken. The protection he
would afford religious practice is therefore largely coextensive with the
protection afforded to expressive conduct more generally under the First
Amendment. Second, I argue that Justice Stevens places too much faith in
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Law Clerk for Justice
John Paul Stevens, October Term 2000.
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the ability of legislatures to look out for the interests of minority religious
groups, ignoring the important role that courts play in signaling to
legislatures situations in which minority religions appear to be suffering
disproportionately under generally applicable regulations. Accordingly, in
Part V, I propose a different approach, one that builds on Justice Stevens's
views but that more adequately acknowledges the unique value of religion
in the lives of believers.
I. THE CASE FOR JUSTICE STEVENS'S HOSTILITY TOWARD RELIGION
As religion clause scholars have noted, religion jurisprudence tends to
come in prepackaged bundles of views. Douglas Laycock divides the
universe of religion cases into three broad categories: cases concerning
funding for religious organizations, cases concerning sponsorship of
religion and religious speech in public places, and cases concerning the
regulation of religious practice. 1  According to Laycock, the most
conservative three Justices, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and former
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, have consistently voted to permit
funding for religion and to protect religious speech, even by the
government. 2 In contrast, the most liberal four Justices, Stevens, David H.
Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, have consistently
voted to prohibit religious funding and often to prohibit religious speech in
public fora. 3  On questions of protection of religious groups against
government regulation, the roles have typically, though not as consistently,
been reversed, with the more liberal Justices favoring broader protection of
religious groups from government regulation, and the more conservative
Justices favoring narrower protection.4
Each of these two bundles of positions is broadly coherent.
Conservatives, as a general matter, appear willing to entrust the legal status
of religion to the political process. They would empower the majority to a
significant degree to determine the scope and content of both governmental
religious expression and government regulation of religious groups. In the
run of Establishment Clause cases, this tendency works in favor of religious
litigants who in those cases generally represent (at least local) majority
faiths. In free exercise cases, however, it tends to work against religious
claimants, who in those cases are typically minority religions. Liberals, in
contrast, appear to be suspicious of political control over government's
relationship with religion. This tendency generally works against religious
1. See Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and
Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 155,
156 (2004).
2. See id. at 157.
3. See id. Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony Kennedy typically acted as
swing votes on both issues. See id.
4. See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DePaul L. Rev. 993, 1009-10 (1990).
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groups in Establishment Clause cases but in favor of religions claimants in
the context of free exercise challenges to overbearing state action.
As is so often the case, Justice Stevens's position in this area is unique.
He tends to side with the more liberal justices on Establishment Clause
questions, favoring broad judicial invalidation of both public funding of
religion and public religious expression, but usually votes with the more
conservative justices in rejecting free exercise-based claims for exemption
of religious groups from government regulation. On the establishment side,
he has been as reliable a vote as any against funding of religion and public
religious expression. 5 In fact, he has gone farther than most. Notably, he
was alone in arguing that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act amounted
to an unconstitutional establishment of religion.6
In contrast to his usual compatriots in the establishment arena, Stevens is
a staunch supporter of the Court's increasingly narrow free exercise
jurisprudence. He has rarely found a free exercise claim that he liked, no
matter how trivial the cost to government. 7 He joined the majority in
Employment Division v. Smith8 in concluding that "the right of free exercise
does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and
neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)." 9 Indeed, it
is fair to call Stevens the father of Smith, since the heart of the Smith test is
drawn directly out of Justice Stevens's concurring opinion in United States
v. Lee. 10 Accordingly, for Justice Stevens, more than for any other Justice,
the "religious" side in religion clause cases often finds itself on the short
end of the stick. 1
Scholars have struggled to formulate a principle that might tie together
the two halves of Justice Stevens's unique take on the religion clauses.
Unable to come up with one, some have concluded that "[t]he apparent
explanation for this voting pattern is hostility to religion. Religion in his
view is subject to all the burdens of government, but entitled to few of the
benefits." 12
For those of us who know and admire Justice Stevens, the notion that his
religion jurisprudence is based on sheer hostility is hard to stomach. From
my personal experience as his clerk, I know Justice Stevens to be one of the
5. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 863
(1995) (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, J.J., dissenting); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 694 (1984) (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, J.J., dissenting).
6. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536-37 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring).
7. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (voting to uphold refusal of
the U.S. Air Force to permit an Orthodox Jew to wear a yarmulke).
8. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
9. Id. at 879 (internal quotation omitted).
10. 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
11. Justices David H. Souter and Stephen G. Breyer have called for the reconsideration
of Smith, while Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has yet to reveal her position on the question.
See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 565 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 566 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
12. Laycock, supra note 4, at 1010.
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most fair-minded and tolerant people I have ever met. Even the most casual
acquaintance with his jurisprudence will be struck by its thoughtfulness and
subtlety. It is therefore worth exploring Justice Stevens's religion votes in a
bit more detail. By focusing particular attention on the admittedly
infrequent cases in which Justice Stevens has voted in favor of religious
groups, we can generate a more complete picture of the conceptual
underpinnings of his religion jurisprudence. What emerges is a complex
view of the proper relationship between the state and religious groups, one
that cannot be dismissed as rooted in mere hostility.
II. JUSTICE STEVENS'S VOTES IN FAVOR OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS
Despite the characterization of Justice Stevens as hostile to religious
groups, he has voted in favor of religious organizations in a number of
significant cases, reflecting a wide array of factual scenarios: state funding
for religious believers, regulation of religious practice, internal church
governance, and religious speech.
A. State Funding for Religious Believers
Justice Stevens has voted with the majority in a series of decisions in
which the Court blocked the state from refusing unemployment benefits to
people who had lost their jobs as a result of their religious beliefs. In
Thomas v. Review Board,13 the Court built on its decision in Sherbert v.
Verner,14 and held that a religiously motivated pacifist was entitled to
unemployment benefits when he left his job after being transferred to a
department of his company that manufactured tank turrets. "Where the
state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by
a religious faith," the Court held in Thomas, "or where it denies such a
benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting
substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his
beliefs, a burden upon religion exists." 15  Over a dissent by Justice
Rehnquist, the Court rejected the state's arguments that this burden was
justified by the state interest in limiting unemployment and discouraging
employers from inquiring into potential employees' religious beliefs. 16 In
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,17 Justice Stevens again
joined the Court in expanding the Sherbert line of cases, again over a
Rehnquist dissent, this time by applying it to a recent convert. Finally, in
Frazee v. Illinois Department of Social Security,'8 Justice Stevens voted to
extend the Sherbert line of cases to cover a claimant whose refusal to work
13. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
14. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
15. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18.
16. See id. at 718-19.
17. 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
18. 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
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on the Sabbath was not based on membership in an organized religious
group but rather on "personal professed religious belief."19
The Sherbert cases arose under the Free Exercise Clause, but Justice
Stevens has also sided with religious claimants against states raising the
Establishment Clause as a reason for denying them funding. In Witters v.
Washington Department of Services for the Blind,20 the Court rejected the
state's arguments that it could not fund the plaintiff to study "the Bible,
ethics, speech, and church administration in order to equip himself for a
career as a pastor, missionary, or youth director."'21 Washington State,
which provided aid for education of the blind, denied Witters the requested
assistance because, in its view, granting the aid would violate state and
federal constitutional prohibitions on assistance to religion. With Justice
Stevens in the majority, the Court reversed, holding that the provision of aid
to Witters, who was then free to use it to pursue whatever course of study
he chose, did not constitute an impermissible direct subsidy of religion.
"Any aid provided under Washington's program that ultimately flows to
religious institutions," the Court explained, "does so only as a result of the
genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients. '22
B. Regulation of Religious Practice
Justice Stevens has also voted in favor of religious claimants in several
cases concerning the regulation of religious practice. He voted with the rest
of the Court in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,23
to overturn a city ordinance prohibiting the ritual killing of animals.
Although the statute was written in facially neutral terms, the Court
concluded that it was in fact specifically aimed at suppressing the animal
sacrifices central to the practice of the Santeria religion.24  As a
consequence, it constituted an invalid infringement on free exercise
rights.25 Justice Stevens also sided with a Baptist minister prohibited by
Tennessee law from seeking state office. 26 Finally, in an interesting
inversion of his concurring opinion in City of Boerne, Justice Stevens voted
with a unanimous court in Cutter v. Wilkinson 27 to uphold the portions of
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA")
having to do with prisoners against an Establishment Clause challenge.
19. Id. at 831 (quoting Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Soc. Sec., 512 N.E.2d 789, 790 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1987)).
20. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
21. Id. at 483.
22. Id. at 487.
23. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
24. See id. at 534.
25. See id. at 542-47.
26. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
27. 125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005).
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C. Internal Church Governance
Justice Stevens has also voted to exempt religious groups from
government regulation that touches on questions of internal church
relations. In Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, Justice Stevens voted with the majority to reject
an establishment challenge to Title VII's exemption of religious
organizations from prohibitions against religious discrimination in
employment as applied to a nonprofit gymnasium run in Salt Lake City by
the defendant, the Mormon Church, 28 He also voted with the majority in
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,29 construing the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA") as excluding parochial school teachers from its
protection, in part because applying the NLRA to Catholic schoolteachers
would raise serious First Amendment questions.
D. Religious Speakers
Finally, in a series of cases, Justice Stevens has voted to protect the rights
of religious groups or individuals to engage in proselytizing speech in
public places. In Heffron v. International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. ("ISKCON"), 30 he joined Justices William J. Brennan,
Jr., and Thurgood Marshall in dissenting in part from a decision upholding
a rule confining ISKCON members (along with all others seeking to
distribute printed materials) to enclosed booths at the Minnesota state fair.31
Because the rule permitted those visiting the fair freely to "give speeches,
engage in face-to-face advocacy, campaign, or proselytize," the dissenters
argued, it violated ISKCON's First Amendment speech rights for the state
not to allow ISKCON's members to hand out the group's literature while
roaming through the crowd.32 Similarly, in Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free School District,33 Justice Stevens voted with the
majority in holding that the defendant school district could not open its
facilities to after-hours activities by private groups but exclude groups
engaging in speech from a religious point of view. Finally, in Watchtower
Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton,34 Justice
Stevens, writing for the Court, reasoned that an ordinance requiring
individuals to obtain a permit before engaging in door-to-door advocacy
violated their speech rights. The ordinance in the case allowed residents to
prevent solicitation even by licensed solicitors by filling out a form with the
28. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
29. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
30. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
31. Id. at 656 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
32. Id at 658.
33. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
34. 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
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town's mayor. 35 In his opinion, Justice Stevens favorably quoted passages
from earlier cases lauding the importance of door-to-door religious
canvassing, noting that '" [t]his form of religious activity occupies the same
high estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and
preaching from the pulpits."' 36
III. TYING STEVENS'S RELIGION VOTES TOGETHER: RESPECTFUL
APPREHENSION
Focusing on the many cases in which Justice Stevens has voted in favor
of religious claimants makes it far more difficult to attribute his decisions to
simple hostility to religion. His votes in these cases suggest that Justice
Stevens does not harbor ill will towards religious speech, but, on the
contrary, views religious speakers as engaged in core activity protected by
the First Amendment. 37 Indeed, his careful policing of the prerogatives of
internal church governance indicates a commitment to church autonomy,
even in the face of important countervailing social values. Finally, his
occasional willingness to deviate from his general preference to read the
Establishment Clause expansively and the Free Exercise Clause narrowly
demonstrates that something other than hostility must be at work. What
emerges from this collection of votes is a view of religion as an important,
but dangerous, category of behavior that is, for the most part, able to fend
for itself in the political process. Judicial intervention in defense of religion
is therefore appropriate, on Justice Stevens's view, principally in situations
in which the Court thinks it likely that a religious group (or believer) is
being unfairly singled out for unequal treatment or where some
sub-category of religious groups (or believers) are particularly vulnerable to
state coercion.
As Professor Christopher Eisgruber notes in his contribution to this
Symposium, Justice Stevens has found the greatest merit in free exercise
cases where religious believers have suffered uniquely unfavorable
treatment at the hands of the state.38  In his opinion in Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Commission, concurring in the judgment, Justice
Stevens explained that judicially enforced free exercise relief was necessary
in the Sherbert line of cases to protect religious believers against "unequal
treatment."'39 If the state permits workers discharged for other reasons to
35. See id. at 156. Interestingly, each of the forms contained nineteen suggested
categories of canvassers who could be excluded, one of which was "Jehovah's Witnesses."
Id. at 157 n.6.
36. Id. at 161 (quoting Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1943)).
37. When he has voted against religious speakers in this context, it has been because he
has had doubts about the scope of the forum in which they are seeking to speak. See, e.g.,
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 130 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice Stevens, Religious Freedom, and the Value of
Equal Membership, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 2177 (2006); see also United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
39. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 148 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
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receive unemployment benefits, Justice Stevens suggested, it should treat
sincerely held religious beliefs no less favorably. 40 His vote in Lukumi falls
squarely within this antidiscrimination principle. 41
Conversely, when the state has conferred special, though narrowly
tailored, benefits on religious groups (or believers) that are, for some
particular reason, uniquely vulnerable, Justice Stevens has declined to find
Establishment Clause violations. Thus, while in Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris,42 he argued in stark terms that issuing vouchers to parents that
could be used for public schools would violate the Establishment Clause, in
Witters he joined a decision holding that a grant of similar assistance to a
blind student seeking to study for the ministry would not.43 Similarly, in
his concurring opinion in City of Boerne, he argued that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act's grant of heightened protection to all religious
groups violated the Establishment Clause,44 whereas in Cutter he joined an
opinion upholding a very similar grant of heightened protection for
prisoners under the RLUIPA. 45
Justice Stevens's votes in Witters and Cutter appear to be united by a
concern with the uniquely vulnerable nature of the claimants in the two
cases: the blind and the imprisoned. The focus of the provisions in
question on those two vulnerable categories both justified the state's
effective subsidization of religion and provided a limiting principle that
ensured that the subsidies would not become a generalized state support for
religion. In contrast, in Zelman and City of Boerne, the benefits conferred
on religious groups swept so broadly that Justice Stevens may have
concluded that they were impermissible attempts to grant favored status to
religious groups as a whole, including those in no special need of
protection.
In sum, Justice Stevens's votes in favor of religious claimants undermine
the view that he is hostile to religion. Instead, a fair review of his voting
record suggests that, while he is extremely sensitive to the potentially
divisive effects of religious differences, particularly when mingled with the
power of the state, he respects religion as an important sphere of human
endeavor. Moreover, although he is generally optimistic about the ability
of religious groups (or believers) to protect themselves in the democratic
political process, he is sensitive to the possibility that at times that process
will fall short. As a consequence, he is willing to provide judicial
protection to religious claimants, including exempting religious groups
from regulation, when legislatures appear to have singled out a religious
claimant for adverse treatment. In addition, he appears to be willing to give
40. See id.
41. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993);
see also supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
42. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
43. Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
44. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring).
45. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005).
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legislative bodies some leeway to grant exemptions to religious subgroups
that are uniquely vulnerable in some way.
IV. SOME PROBLEMS WITH JUSTICE STEVENS'S VIEW OF RELIGION
Although Justice Stevens's religion jurisprudence is more substantial and
principled than the caricatured view of him held by some commentators,
there are still substantial problems with his approach. First, at times it
seems that, for Justice Stevens, the value of religion reduces in large part to
its status as a form of constitutionally protected speech or expression, as
important as, say, political speech, but no more so. But by reducing the
value of religion to its status as speech or expression, Justice Stevens
misses the singular role played by religion within the human experience.
Moreover (and relatedly), treating religion as uniquely divisive without
recognizing the need for strong judicial protection of religious minorities
causes Justice Stevens's religion clause jurisprudence to veer too far in the
direction of unfettered majoritarianism.
A. Religion and Speech
It is probably no coincidence that many of the cases in which Justice
Stevens has voted in favor of religious groups have been brought under the
rubric of freedom of speech, and not freedom of religion. 46 As Professor
Gregory P. Magarian observes in his contribution to this Symposium,
Justice Stevens is a strong, though pragmatic, believer in the judicial
maintenance of robust public discourse fed and watered by constitutionally
protected speech. 47 As I noted above, Justice Stevens has said that he
considers religious speech to constitute core speech essential to the
maintenance of such vibrant public discourse. And it is indeed the case that
a great deal of religiously motivated behavior takes the form of speech.
Accordingly, strong protection of speech inevitably redounds to the benefit
of religious speakers.
But the analogy between the protections afforded speech and religion in
the modem free exercise jurisprudence (which largely tracks Justice
Stevens's views) goes beyond the very real and obvious overlap between
religion and speech that occurs when the speech in question is in fact
religious. Justice Stevens's (and, since Smith, the Court's) treatment of the
regulation of religious conduct has for the most part extended to religiously
motivated conduct the same meager protections afforded by the Speech
Clause against incidental burdens on other forms of expressive conduct.48
46. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002);
Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Heffron v. Int'l
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
47. Gregory P. Magarian, The Pragmatic Populism of Justice Stevens's Free Speech
Jurisprudence, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 2201 (2006).
48. Indeed, one might argue that, at least as a matter of formal doctrine, expressive
conduct receives greater protection against incidental burdens under the Speech Clause of
the First Amendment than religious conduct does under the Free Exercise Clause. Compare
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Broadly speaking, under both the Speech and Free Exercise Clauses, the
government may incidentally burden expressive or religious conduct, as
long the burdens result from the application of neutral laws of general
applicability that do not themselves discriminate among points of view.49
Under this approach, even the most trivial government interests can justify
nondiscriminatory government action that incidentally imposes extremely
severe burdens on religious practice. 50 In other words, when the treatment
of religious exemptions and expressive conduct are juxtaposed, it appears
that the constitutional protection of expressive conduct serves as both a
ceiling and a floor for the protection of religious exercise, a state of affairs
that makes the Free Exercise Clause's protections of religious conduct from
government regulation seem more or less superfluous.
This observation is likely to be relatively untroubling for many scholars,
particularly those who have argued in recent years that religion is in fact not
entitled to special status when it comes to constitutionally mandated
exemptions from government regulation. Perhaps most prominently,
Professor Eisgruber and Professor Lawrence Sager have argued that
religiously motivated activity is not entitled to exemptions from general
government regulation that are not also afforded to analogous
conscientiously, though secularly, motivated conduct.51  Religion, they
argue, although certainly valuable to its members, is not necessarily more
valuable than any number of strongly held secular commitments. 52
Moreover, it is not intrinsically more valuable or useful to society as a
whole. 53 Accordingly, it should not be singled out for privileged status
within a constitutional doctrine of expression.
Eisgruber and Sager posit the hypothetical of Vincent, a man who is
utterly committed to the pursuit of his art.54 Vincent's commitments appear
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) ("[G]ovemment regulation [of.
expressive conduct] is ... justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest."), with Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990)
("[G]enerally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a particular
religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest .... ").
49. See Note, Making Sense of Hybrid Speech: A New Model for Commercial Speech
and Expressive Conduct, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2836, 2852 (2005) (observing that, while
regulations that incidentally burden expressive conduct are subject to a form of intermediate
scrutiny, they are never invalidated).
50. See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
51. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of
Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1245, 1254-60 (1994); see also Stephen G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering
the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 75 (1990); Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in
Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 149 (1991); Steven D. Smith, What Does
Religion Have to Do with Freedom of Conscience?, 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 911 (2005).
52. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 51, at 1264.
53. See id. at 1265-67.
54. Seeid. at 1255.
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to be every bit as powerful as those of religious believers, but the strength
of his commitment does not entitle him to exemptions from generally
applicable laws; they argue:
Vincent is not entitled to an economic structure that permits him to
prosper; Vincent is not entitled to collect unemployment insurance if he is
by virtue of his passion unavailable for work; Vincent is not entitled to
consume peyote even if, like Coleridge, he does his best work in an
altered state of consciousness; Vincent is not entitled to bring toxic paints
vital to the full realization of his artistic vision into his locality in the face
of local environmental laws prohibiting their possession and use.55
Eisgruber and Sager argue that the advocate of privileging religiously
motivated conduct (over other sorts of conduct) cannot point to anything
that would justify treating such conduct more favorably than, say, conduct
motivated by a deep commitment to art, or justice, or philosophy. 56
A number of scholars have taken up the challenge. My colleague
Professor Abner Greene, for example, has argued that the uniquely
inaccessible nature of religious reasoning justifies treating the category of
religiously motivated conduct differently than conduct motivated by
reasons for acting whose merits can be debated according to generally
accepted standards of rationality. 57 In a similar vein, Judge Michael
McConnell has argued that, in contrast to the other sorts of deep
commitments mentioned by Eisgruber and Sager, religion is unique in its
tendency to present itself to believers as an obligation imposed not as a
matter of individual autonomy but rather a command from God.58 Unlike
McConnell's religious believer, Victor is likely to acknowledge that his
deep commitment to art is largely a matter of subjective preference and
choice; if he is honest, he may even concede that his commitment to art is
largely arbitrary, a matter of happenstance that is not binding in any general
sense on others who do not share his particular constellation of preferences
and talents.
In addition to its tendency to present its tenets as binding commands,
religions differ from other types of human commitments in another
fundamental respect: the sorts of questions they address. 59  Religious
beliefs address themselves to the most fundamental, irreducible questions of
human meaning. This orientation towards the ultimate in turn leads
religious belief systems to be uniquely all encompassing in the demands
they place on believers. 60 Although a deep secular commitment can
55. See id.
56. See id. at 1262.
57. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Is Religion Special? A Rejoinder to Scott Idleman, 1994
U. 111. L. Rev. 535, 537-39.
58. See Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DePaul L.
Rev. 1,28 (2000).
59. See Eduardo Pefialver, Note, The Concept of Religion, 107 Yale L. 791, 819-20
(1997).
60. See Marci A. Hamilton, God vs. the Gavel: Religion and the Rule of Law 294
(2005) (arguing that religious belief systems are uniquely comprehensive in scope).
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virtually always be conjoined with other deep secular commitments or even
with certain religious commitments, the uniquely comprehensive nature of
religious commitments means that they typically cannot be conjoined with
one another.
Taking up the example of Victor posited by Eisgruber and Sager, we can
imagine Victor's deep commitment to art cohabiting with any number of
other deep commitments. Victor, or someone like him, might be fully
committed to the pursuit of both his art and of pleasure, of both art and
justice, or, indeed, of both art and Christianity. But it would make
absolutely no sense to talk about Victor as fully committed to both
Christianity and Islam, or to both Judaism and Santeria.
It is precisely this comprehensive nature that makes religious systems so
valuable to their adherents. Religious systems typically have something
decisive to say to believers about every facet of human existence: the
meaning of life and death; the existence of evil, adversity, and suffering;
and the best way to coordinate and structure virtually every deep
commitment to which the believer applies herself. Religious systems are
therefore uniquely capable of comprehensively ordering, and conferring
sustained meaning upon, the lives of believers. 61 Their singularly all-
encompassing, meaning-conferring nature makes religious systems
particularly valuable to believers and renders legal interference with their
operation problematic in a way that is unlike the harm inflicted by
interfering with other sorts of expressive conduct. In failing to treat
religiously motivated behavior as fundamentally distinct in kind from other
forms of expressive conduct, Justice Stevens's (and the Court's) free
exercise jurisprudence fails to give due regard to religion's unique nature
and to the singular value of religious commitments.
B. The Need for Robust Judicial Protection of Religious Minorities
Eisgruber and Sager (and Justice Stevens) might well concede the limited
distinctiveness of religion along, say, the lines suggested by Greene and
McConnell. The lesson they would draw from the epistemological isolation
of religion, however, is that religious groups, particularly minority religious
groups, are uniquely vulnerable, but not necessarily valuable.62
Nevertheless, their willingness to concede that religious beliefs and
practices may be particularly vulnerable suggests that they are open to the
exemption of some religious practices from generally applicable
regulations. But grounding such an entitlement in the vulnerability of
religion, rather than its value, leads them towards a fundamentally different
orientation in considering the merits of exemption claims, one that places
antidiscrimination concerns at center stage. 63
61. See Pefialver, supra note 59, at 806-07.
62. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 51, at 1248.
63. See id. at 1248, 1283.
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Although Justice Stevens has not explicitly rested his exemptions
jurisprudence on the vulnerability of religious belief, in the exemptions
context his preoccupation with regulations that single out or discriminate
against particular religious groups suggests that he would likely be
sympathetic to the logic of Eisgruber and Sager's explanation. After all, the
recognition of the potentially oppressive power of religious faction that runs
so strongly through his Establishment Clause jurisprudence implicitly
contains within itself a concern for the effects of that power on religious
(and secular) dissenters. Danger and vulnerability are, in this context, two
sides of the same coin.
Although he appears willing to acknowledge the vulnerability of
religious minorities, Justice Stevens also seems to place a great deal of faith
in the ability of the democratic process in most instances to strike the
correct balance between regulation and exemption of religious practices.
Accordingly, his inclination is to leave the creation of exemptions to the
political process absent evidence that a religious group has been singled out
for unequal treatment. 64
Eisgruber and Sager try to assuage fears about the ability of majoritarian
political processes to safeguard the interests of minority religious groups.
They point towards a series of infamous free exercise cases in which
minority groups were turned away by the courts only to be granted the
relief they sought by the legislatures. In Lyng, Lee, Goldman, and Smith,
the judiciary failed to protect the interests of Jews, Native Americans, and
the Amish.65  In the wake of each of those decisions, however, the
legislatures intervened to safeguard the threatened religious practices. 66
Even assuming arguendo that religion is entitled to certain exemptions from
generally applicable laws, the argument goes, courts have demonstrated that
they are not the best entities to enforce such a privilege and that legislatures
are well positioned and have proved willing to take into consideration the
interests of religious groups.
In a similar vein, scholars have sometimes looked at the legislature's
demonstrated tendency to grant relief where courts have failed to do so to
denigrate the substantive benefits for religious groups of the more
64. Commitment to the notion that religious systems are uniquely valuable does not
necessarily entail rejecting Justice John Paul Stevens's opposition to judicially crafted
exemptions from legal regulation for religious groups. Professor Marci Hamilton, for
example, concedes that religious systems are uniquely all-encompassing systems of thought
that play unique roles in the lives of believers. See Hamilton, supra note 60, at 294-95. But,
for reasons having to do with what she calls "rule of law," she argues that exemptions from
generally applicable regulations should be left to legislatures and not the courts. See id. at
297.
65. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986);
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
66. See 10 U.S.C. § 774 (2000) (granting the relief sought in Goldman); 26 U.S.C.
§ 3121(w) (2000) (granting the relief sought in Lee); Or. Rev. Stat. § 475.992(5) (2003)
(granting the exemption sought in Smith); H.R. Rep. No. 100-713, at 72 (1988) (overturning
Lyng).
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permissive, pre-Smith free exercise standard. Although courts claimed to
be imposing strict scrutiny, they say, religious claimants almost never
prevailed. Empirical evidence suggests, however, that the Court's doctrinal
shift in Smith substantially reduced the willingness of lower courts to grant
relief to minority religious groups seeking relief from burdensome
regulations. Prior to Smith, the requested exemptions were granted in
nearly forty percent of the cases; after Smith, this dropped to under thirty
percent.67
Despite the mixed track record of courts at protecting religious
minorities, the structure of the four examples cited by Eisgruber and Sager
demonstrates, as they acknowledge, the important signaling function played
by lawsuits seeking exemptions from general regulations. 68 In each of the
four examples, the legislature first enacted a generally applicable rule that
did not include exemptions for religious communities for whom those
regulations constituted substantial burdens. The communities responded by
resorting to the courts for assistance. When judicial relief was not
forthcoming, legislatures, alerted to the attention of the conflict by the
judicial decision itself, responded by exempting the groups from the
regulation in question. 69
This dialog between legislatures and the courts is threatened when courts
adopt an excessively pinched understanding of the Free Exercise Clause.
When courts overtly signal to believers that they are not a sympathetic
forum, as they have since Smith, their ability to bring the existence of
disproportionate burdens placed by generally applicable laws on minority
religious groups to the attention of the legislature is compromised.
Unsurprisingly, in the years after Smith, the number of free exercise
challenges brought by religious groups dropped by over half.70
In other words, while there is some room for optimism about the
willingness of legislatures to protect the interests of minority religious
groups, the story is a complicated one in which both courts and legislatures
play crucial roles. When combined with an acknowledgement of religion's
unique value, the evidence of judicial behavior appears to favor a free
exercise jurisprudence that empowers courts to grant requested relief when
appropriate while leaving room for legislative involvement as a backstop
for situations in which, as is often the case, judges are overly tentative in
their consideration of requests for exemptions. Removing either piece of
the mechanism leaves minority religious groups substantially under
protected.
67. See Amy Adamczyk et al., Religious Regulation and the Courts: Documenting the
Effects of Smith and RFRA, 46 J. Church & St. 237, 248-51 (2004). Interestingly, before
Smith, courts appeared to be markedly majoritarian in their decision making, ruling in favor
of mainline groups at a higher rate than they did in favor of minority groups. See id at 245-
48.
68. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 51, at 1306.
69. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
70. See Adamczyk et al., supra note 67, at 251.
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V. RELIGION AS SIMULTANEOUSLY VULNERABLE, VALUABLE, AND
DANGEROUS
Just as the potential danger of religious majorities run amok implies the
unique vulnerability of religious minorities, an argument can also be made
that both the danger and vulnerability of religion are inseparable from
religion's unique value. On this view, the special danger posed by religion
(and consequently the unique vulnerability of religious groups) can itself be
seen as flowing from the same features of religious thought that make it
uniquely valuable to human beings. The result is a view of religion as
uniquely, and simultaneously, valuable, vulnerable, and dangerous. Such a
view would in turn create the imperative for a religion clause jurisprudence
that adequately takes account of all three of these features.
The argument that religion must be, at once, vulnerable, valuable, and
dangerous goes something like this: The ultimate nature of the questions
addressed by religious belief systems, and the marked tendency of such
systems to be all encompassing, is precisely what gives rise to the typical
failure of those systems at critical moments to adhere to generally accepted
rules for rational discourse. Religions virtually always focus on
fundamental "why" questions, questions about ultimate meaning, the
answers to which are normally, and very self-consciously, grounded in
explanations that are beyond the reach of human reason. Religions deal in
faith and mystery. The abiding appeal of religious systems suggests a deep
human longing for answers to questions that human reason cannot resolve.
Far from being a reproach, non-rationality is therefore an unavoidable
consequence of the unique subject matter of religious questions.
Similarly, the sorts of questions to which religion is typically addressed,
and the nonrational nature of the answers it typically supplies, helps to
explain the experience of obligation on which McConnell focuses. In light
of its comprehensive, self-referential, and, consequently, nonrational
orientation, religious belief is normally transmitted through means that are
plainly inconsistent with notions of autonomous choice. The two principal
methods through which religious faith is formed, inculcation and
conversion, illustrate this phenomenon. Both are fundamentally unchosen
experiences. Children are authoritatively trained from birth into the
patterns of thought and idiosyncratic logic of particular religious systems.
For its part, religious conversion is, in its paradigmatic forms, a
fundamental change of orientation experienced by the believer as the
recognition of a truth that is irresistibly given from the outside, a bolt from
the blue.71
The affirmation of an indissoluble bond tying together religion's unique
value, vulnerability, and danger is, in addition to its inherent plausibility,
the perspective on religion that is best able to explain the unique balance of
burden and benefit scholars have observed at the heart of the religion




clauses.72 If, for example, religion were uniquely valuable and vulnerable
without being potentially dangerous, it would be difficult to understand the
Establishment Clause restrictions on the state's explicit endorsement and
inculcation of religious faith.73
Conversely, if religion were simply dangerous and vulnerable, without
being uniquely valuable, it would be difficult to understand why the state
should not be able to use the means at its disposal (e.g., public education or
direct government speech) actively to discourage religious faith.
Vulnerability would not, without more, justify the requirements of equal
regard that Eisgruber and Sager advocate, particularly when we trace the
ultimate origins of that vulnerability to its source in the dangerousness of
religious thought itself. Discouraging all religious activity equally would
be a very effective means of reducing the vulnerability of minority religious
groups, but only at the cost of discouraging religious activity in general. By
balancing the unique vulnerability and danger of religion, on the one hand,
against its unique value, on the other, we can make better sense of the
Constitution's delicate tightrope.
A religion jurisprudence that recognized the unique value of religion
would likely favor a broader scope for free exercise exemptions than exists
under the Court's current miserly approach. The present presumption of
validity enjoyed by regulation burdening religion, for example, would be
much harder to sustain. If religion were viewed as uniquely precious,
neutral regulations in the service of trivial state goals that had the
unmistakable effect of severely harming the expression of particular
religious communities would not be given the benefit of the doubt. A
jurisprudence that attached unique value to religion would require
something much closer to the pre-Smith state of affairs, which, whatever the
actual results religious claimants were able to achieve, at least attempted to
strike a balance between the importance of government interests served by
a regulation and the burden it imposed on religious practices.
CONCLUSION
Justice Stevens is not the antireligious crank that scholars sometimes
make him out to be. A careful look at his voting in religion cases suggests
that he has a healthy respect for religious thought, although this respect is
tempered by a fear of the divisive power of religious disputes in public life.
Despite his sensitivity to the very real dangers posed by religious divisions,
he appears to place excessive faith in the ability of the majoritarian political
process to take into account the interests of minority faiths. Moreover, his
jurisprudence fails to strike the proper balance between the danger posed by
religious majorities and the unique value of religious belief systems in the
72. See generally Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102
Yale L. 1611 (1993).
73. Of course, on this view, Establishment Clause restrictions might be viewed as a
means of protecting religion from the state, and not vice versa.
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lives of human beings. A view of religion that took into account the
singular value of religious systems of thought, combined with a greater
openness to judicial involvement in the process of exempting religious
groups from generally applicable regulations, would better reflect the
careful balance of the religion clauses and better protect the interests of
religious dissenters.
